Introduction
In the late 1990s, an institutional structure -an 'architecture of media law' -emerged in post-conflict zones for the temporary generation and application of norms regulating mass media content during the transition from international to domestic governance. 1 The creation of this system for post-conflict information intervention, which we will call a 'module' to illustrate its incipient nature, was predicated on the belief that a self-contained set of formal rules and procedures -a system of law -is necessary in the absence of an operating domestic legal regime in order to respond adequately to purportedly abusive media content and at the same time to provide safeguards protecting the exercise of expressive rights recognized under international standards. 2, 3 The module first appeared with the establishment of the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. 4 It was borrowed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and has undergone refinement since the establishment in Kosovo of the office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) in June 2000. 5 In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, it is being phased out, to give way to yet another new structure in an interim system of governance more closely tied to local institutions and personnel. 6 It is likely that the module will be considered for use in future post-conflict settings, as well as exerting some influence on the further development of media regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo~ this chapter, we examine aspects of the module's structure, normative base, and process, and seek to identify its implications for development of a law of information intervention if indeed it is gaining traction as a portable 'fix' for employment in the increasing number of transitory post-conflict environments. Because it represents a refinement of the module, we will focus on the Kosovo (UNMIK) system while making references to its predecessor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not claim to have many complete answers; instead, we merely hope to raise useful questions and to suggest perspectives from which to judge whether the module's components are consistent with applicable international standards. mg omestic egal system. Because it serves equivalent purposes, we seek to assess the module the way we would a domestic system of media content regulation, starting with its constitutional foundations and then analyzing its st~u~ture, rules, and procedures. It must be seen not in isolation, but instead withm a larger constitutional order that presents an institutional structure and a set of fundamental norms with which all governing acts -legislative executive and judicial -must comply. ' ,
In Kosovo, the basic document for the UNMIK administration is Security Council Resolution 1244, enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Char:er. lO In ~ection 6, Resolution 1244 authorized the secretary-general to appomt a SpecIal Representative (the SRSG) to control the implementation of the international civil presence in Kosovo. In turn, the SRSG ordered th bl · h . 11 e esta IS ment of the TMC m June 2000. The nature of this structure means that the module is part of a chain of delegation and supervisory responsibility th~t extends back from the TMC to the SRSG, the UN secretary-general, and ultImately to the UN Security Council. 12 In addition to structure, an essential component of the UNMIK constituti?n~l orde~ is. th~ fo~mal rec?gnition of fundamental norms that are legally bmdmg on ItS mstItutlOns. UltImately, the basis for these lies in Articles 55 and Of this list, the European Convention is particularly noteworthy, both for the fact that it is the only regional instrument included and the fact that, at least in the field of mass media law, the media regulatory authorities in Kosovo have identified Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and, along with it, the Article 10 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as the basis . h f h . .. 14 15,16 for definmg t e parameters 0 t e1r activity. ' We also make an assumption that is important for our analysis: that the UNMIK institutions are bound by certain general principles of law that have been recognized by domestic legal systems and supranational and international organizations. 17 Of these, we are particularly concerned with separation of powers principles, such as the independence of prosecutors from the legislative and executive branches and provision of independent review of executive and prosecutorial acts.
The Module as a Self-Contained System of Governance
The module is a self-contained, law-based international regulatory system separate from any domestic legal regime, with a legislator promulgating generally applicable binding norms, a standing authority empowered to prosecute perceived violations of those norms, and control mechanisms designed to supervise the prosecutor's acts.
The norms applicable to the mass media are generated from within this structure rather than from an outside source. In Kosovo, this legislative function is performed by the SRSG, who issues generally-applicable normative . dd"
f . 1819 Th d I ' t' I acts m a ltlon to penormmg executlve unctlOns.' e mo u e s essen la nature is defined by its core institution: a multi-dimensional agency that monitors the media, performs administrative functions such as the granting of broadcast licences, and acts as the prosecutor for imposition of sanctions for violations of the normative base. We will call this agency, which in Kosovo has been the Temporary Media Commissioner and in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Director-General, the 'Regulator'. (Before March 2001, when the IMC was merged with the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency to form the Communications Regulatory Agency, the IMC was headed by a 'Director-General'. The focus of our study is the IMC and the TRA before the merger.)
In Kosovo, the core of the Regulator's prosecutorial duties is found in the SRSG's authorization to the TMC to monitor media content and fashion remedies, including the imposition of sanctions, if the normative base is breached. 2o For example, as to print media, UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, In all, the structural elements of the module suggest that attention has been paid to concerns about provision of safeguards against unconstrained, arbitrary acts by the prosecutorial authorities. However, further assessment of the effectiveness of the system in this regard, including the crucial question of the independence of the control mechanisms, requires evaluation of the normative base and the practical implementation of the module, to which we now turn.
Normative Base
The module is predicated on the conclusion that some form of content supervision and regulation is necessary in post-conflict zones and further that such action will be effective only if there is in place a body of'generall; applicable norms: that is, a formal system of law rather than an ad hoc approach. This conclusion reflects adherence to the general principle that prosecution can be based on no grounds other than those rules published and in existence at the time of the offence. 25
In the module, it is accepted that the normative base is temporary (although indefinite) pending return to domestic rule. While in force, however, the rules of the normative base represent the sum total of the Regulator's enforcement mandate. The temporariness of the rules may be of only cosmetic interest when it comes to the legality of the norms. Unconscionable rules, for example, could not be justified because of their short-lived nature. The Codes of Conduct present more detailed rules. For purposes of examining the regulatory scheme in Kosovo, we focus on the Code of Conduct for the print media, since it is the instrument that has been applied most often in the TMC's prosecutorial practice. The Code's rules governing content and editorial practice are found in the following provisions:
Section 2 (Provocative Statements) 2.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material that encourages crime or criminal activities or which carries imminent risk of causing harm, such harm being defined as death, or injury, or damage to property or other violence. 2.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an ethnic or religious group is responsible for criminal activity.
Section 3 (Privacy) 3.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute any material, that by intent or effect attributes criminal responsibility to any individual prior to a finding of guilt by a lawfully constituted tribunal. 3.2. Publishers will protect the identity of, and will not reveal the names, description, photograph, the likeness of, or specific information about any individual alleged to have committed a crime, unless authorities responsible for the administration of justice have expressly authorized the publication of such information, or unless the individual has been found guilty of the crime by a lawfully constituted tribunal.
Section 5 (Separation of News and Opinion) Publishers, while free to express their own views, will make every effort to distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture, and fact and will clearly entitle editorials and commentaries as such.
Section 6 (False and Deceptive Material) 6.1. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material that they know or ought to know to be false or deceptive. 6.2. Publishers will not write, print, publish or distribute material unless they have undertaken a prudent and reasonable inquiry to ensure the veracity of the material. The SRSG and TMC made selective decisions as to the content of the nor~ative base, not merely absorbing into the module a set of rules from any partIcular legal system. It was important to the SRSG to claim that input was sought from local groups and foreign organizations during the drafting process.
3 ! Viewed in broad perspective, the key characteristic of the normative base is that it reflects the precarious and recurrent tension in human rights law between free expression guarantees and the validity of interferences with the right of free expression, especially where the countervailing interest is protection of individual right to physical security. Care should be taken to consider whether those elements that are contemplated as a surrogate Code of Conduct are of a different quality (from a free expression point of view) from those rules that are akin to domestic law. While the set of rules may find counterparts in domestic settings, many elements might conflict with various constitutional frameworks, such as that established by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. For the UNMIK authorities, the resolution of this tenSion. is ~ound in the emphasis on a particular vision of 'media responsibility', one whIch mcorporates, along with traditional aspects ofIegal regulation, major elements of professional journalistic ethics as well. This is in keeping with the Kosovo normative structure itself, which makes the Codes of Conduct legally binding and enforceable.
The. emphasis on this vision of media responsibility was set forth by the TMC m a lengthy statement disseminated to the public on 9 We cannot tolerate hate speech anywhere in society -whether it is o.n t~e radio, in the classroom, in a newspaper or at a political ra~ly .. Whlch ~s why the issuing of the regulation on hate speech at t~e beglllnlllg of thlS month was so important. Most of all, the new regulation sh~uld .work as a deterrent. I raise this now because while the mechanisms wlll eXlst to pull the plug on a radio or TV station, the same cannot b~ done to. a newspaper. We have no plan to have a press law for prlllted med~a; in fact we are determined not to have such a law. It smacks of censo~shlp.
But if a paper publishes vitriol and bile, which incite hatred a.galllst a community or group -as some Kosovo papers have done -th~re lS a ~egal route to take action against them. Anyone can lodge a com~lalllt . . It l~ up to the Court to decide whether the journalist, editor or pubhsher lS gmlty.
And if they are they can be fined or )al e .
As these remarks indicate, the international authorities were initial~y reluctant to take steps that went beyond sanctioning of hate speech to regulatlOn of other Howe~er, later, following the events surrounding the death ofPetar Topoljski, a Serblan UNMIK employee, in spring 2000, the SRSG's steps signalled a shift toward a more aggressive approach, abandoning media self-regulation and grounded in a public safety rationale. 35 As crafted in the context oflawlessness in Kosovo, this approach can be summarized to say: journalists have a responsibility, where a democratic state is not fully functioning and where violence is a regular means by which differences are resolved, not to infringe the physical rights of individuals or to increase social tension; where those duties are violated, the authority has the right to discipline. There is the interesting suggestion, here, that greater leeway is permitted to the TMC because it is not only 'law' in the traditional sense, but Codes of Conduct in the self-regulatory sense, that are at issue. If the TMC were acting as a self-generated watchdog of the press, with its powers arising from ethical rules established by the press, then the restrictions, possibly, could be greater than if they originated from the State (or, here, its international equivalent). But, in fact, though the TMC may consider itself the substitute code-carrier incarnate, it is so only because of the origins of power in government.
The shift from hate speech to public safety as the core underlying public interest rationale is also significant. It shows that the normative base in the module can be flexible, lending itself to transfer to different post-conflict situations. The public safety rationale is grounded in the nature of the postconflict setting in Kosovo, in which the UN administration faced a vacuum in civil institution infrastructure, most significantly in judicial institutions, and a chaotic situation marked by widespread violence and considerable potential for
pro onge ,on-golllg VlO ence. T us, it was concluded, strong measures were viewed as necessary for protection of individuals from violence due to the absence of domestic legal authority and the existence of, or potential for, widespread lawlessness.
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Because of this shift from hate speech to public safety, the normative base in Kosovo extends beyond requirements imposed on domestic legal regimes in states party to instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 38 ,39,40 In other words, they go beyond the type of action that is required of states under international law, and rely on the type of action that is permissible under international law force.
. The sum result of this dialectic this effort to balance rights of free expreSSIOn , . , and countervailing rights, is that the scope of the normative base in Kosovo .1S quite narrow. In the end, the vision of media responsibility articulated m Kosovo gives wide latitude to news reporting and commentary that does .not violate the public interest goals of protecting individuals an? grouFs agamst incitement to violence and expressions of hatred. Thus, the 1ssues m Kosovo are not those that typically give rise to the greatest concern among proponents of journalistic freedoms: the normative base does not equate pro:ection of t~e public interest with protection of state interests, or ~ith protectl~n of. publ~c figures or institutions from critical commentary or :v~th suppr~ssmg d1sse~1-nation of facts unfavourable to the governing authontles. In th1S regard, wh1le the normative base does proscribe the dissemination of material which journalists 'know or ought to know to be false or deceptive', it does not (in contrast to many domestic legal system~) dictate ~ore st~ing:~t penalties -",h.en the material is injurious to part1cular pubhc offic1als. Nor d~es 1t l?clude proscriptions against content found to be insulting to pubhc .affic1als or governmental entities.
42 Instead, the primary goal ~f the n~rmat1ve base,. at least as applied in Kosovo thus far, has been to estabhsh the kmd of pr~tectlon against incitement to violence found permissible in many domest1c legal systems and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the hate speech proscriptions found in international instruments. 43
Implementation of the Module: Process and Accountability
It is a truism that the test of a legal system's compliance with fundamental norms as well as fairness and effectiveness, lies in the actual application and enforc~ment of its laws. This is certainly the case with the module as well.
Among the recurring themes in the studies appearing in this volume is not only the need to define substantive standards, but also the structural and procedural requirements satisfactory to establish legitimacy for information intervention. Of these, one of the most pressing is that of institutional and procedural safeguards against improper interference with the exercise of expressive activity.
In a complex context, most of the individuals endowed with these powers of regulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have acted, g~nerally, responsibly and have deliberately sought to maintain the balance mherent in the system of information intervention. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the structure itself, if adopted in future situations, could lend itself to potential abuses. These are new phenomena -it is only very A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION 157 recently that international actors have begun to by-pass domestic legal regimes as the intermediaries of application of international human rights norms in the field of mass media regulation. 44 And the systems of accountability are also new and, if review is by the secretary-general or the Security Council of awesome distance from the locales of post-conflict environments. That is 'a prominent reason for the existence and activity of 'freedom of speech' NGOs.
How does one review implementation of the module, application of the normative base and the procedures that have thus far been developed in its evolution? As before, we are guided by applicable international standards and I . . I I 45 .
genera pnnClp es of aw. A number of these have rece1ved articulation in Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights construing that provision.46
To do this, we will focus first on what we have called, bringing together the existing examples, the office of the Regulator, particularly its prosecutorial functions. Then, we will turn to questions about the module's control mechanisms; in particular, looking at issues of competence and degree of structural independence.
The Office of the Regulator: Public Relations, Investigation, Prosecution
The multi-dimensional office of the Regulator includes both extra-legal and law-based functions. In other words, in some cases, it acts to advance certain policies by means of powers of persuasion, while in others -its more sensitive role -it acts to investigate and prosecute suspected violations of legal norms. The result is a combination of a managerial theory of compliance with traditional criminal law models of forcible enforcement. 47 Within this range of activity, it is possible to delineate several elements of the performance of duties in this office: informal/public advocacy, investigative, and prosecutorial elements. Thus, in carrying out its functions, the Regulator acts as a public advocate for media responsibility, a monitor of mass media conduct and investigator of complaints, and as a formal prosecutor.
Extra-Legal Functions
In general, the manner in which these functions are carried out can be attributed to questions of individual personal style; the very human, personal, direct management of the operation. Models are abstract, impersonal, described, usually, apart from the personnel who implement them. In the case of Kosovo, for example, the success and operation of the framework has been affected in important ways by the personal characteristics of the individual holding the office. 48
The hallmark of the extra-legal activity has been a frank can dour on the part of the Regulator, a readiness to articulate its motivations and its goals. Thus, the Regulator has been vocal in providing expressions of concern and pleas for voluntary compliance with accepted journalistic ethics. The style is open, cajoling, and clearly conscious of the public effect of the TMC's pronouncements. At times, these statements to the journalistic community and the public at large have taken on the character of general observations, perhaps warning about legal violations but without identifying specific offenders. For example, in a 20 February, 2001 news release about its sanctioning decision against the newspaper Epoka eRe, the TMC stated:
The TMC remains deeply concerned about the current levels of inflammatory and potentially dangerous accusation and counter accusation in the Kosovo written press [ ... J Much of the press in Pristina serves up a daily diet of denouncement and insult. As a consequence the TMC considers that the flavour and tenor of the press at present contributes to h '1' h f . 49 t e preval mg atmosp ere 0 tenSIOn.
Or, on other occasions, the TMC addressed concerns about individual news organs to the public and journalistic community with regard to conduct that, while considered irresponsible, was lacking in a legal basis to proceed to prosecution. An example is a TMC 26 March, 2001 news release, entitled 'Altering Photographs', which we reproduce here in full:
Last Friday the 23rd March 2001 all of the major newspapers in Kosovo carried the story of Thursday's tragic shootings at a Macedonian military checkpoint in Tetovo. These stories were all accompanied by photographs, most of which originated from the Reuters News Agency. With the exception of Bota Sot all these newspapers showed a black object on the ground close to the body of one of those who was killed. Indeed there has been considerable debate as to precisely what this object was. The Office of the TMC understands that the circumstances surrounding this incident have caused considerable controversy. In this respect it is not the intention of the Office to comment on these circumstances or on the editorial line taken by any of the newspapers in their Friday editions. However, what is extremely alarming is the apparent removal, by Bota Sot, of a crucial piece of evidence from a photograph taken from an international source.
The Office of the TMC is currently in discussions with the Senior Legal Council of the Reuters News Agency to determine conclusively whether or not Bota Sot altered the original Reuters image to suit the thesis of their article. We have also consulted with them on how they may wish to proceed. Additionally, we are also corresponding with other international news and press agencies, including CNN and AP TN, and have discussed with them their footage and reports of the incident. All have confirmed the presence of the object in their respective photographic or video sequences and from the eye witness accounts of their journalists.
If it were indeed the case that Bota Sot did manipulate the images they obtained from Reuters, this would constitute gross professional misconduct. Furthermore, their attempts to portray all the other media who carried these images, as being misleading would be a further example of deliberate distortion in the face of the overwhelming evidence. It is the duty of editors to report the facts as accurately as possible and to distinguish opinion from fact. This is particularly important when tensions are high and the subject matter is so sensitive. To alter the available evidence to support an opinion and pass it off as news is unconscionable and discredits the profession of journalism. 50 In looking to future applications of the module, we note that the above examples present a fine line between the Regulator's legitimate use of powers of public persuasion and the exercise of a chilling effect on the exercise of rights of expression. The reason for this, of course, is that the Regulator's public statements are always backed by its power to influence media conduct by means of the threat inherent in its authority to prosecute. It will take strict adherence to the normative base, limiting such use of public relations to content falling clearly within its confines, to keep the Regulator from crossing the line into exerting a 'chilling effect' on protected news reporting and commentary.
Legal: the Authority to Investigate and Prosecute
The legal power of the Regulator lies here: in the authority to investigate suspected violations, to assess whether a violation has indeed occurred, and to proceed with the prosecution process, which can culminate in the imposition of sanctions. It is here where the most sensitive concerns about abuse of authority can be found.
The Regulator's investigative activity serves multiple purposes: it provides the regulatory authority with information with which to establish guilt, as well as to identify ameliorating or exacerbating circumstances for the purposes of crafting remedies and/or penalties. Thus, in the Epoka e Re newspaper case, TMC Simon Haselock made an unannounced visit to the newspaper's offices (following an unsuccessful attempt to elicit information by mail from the newspaper), and in the Bota Sot case he engaged in extensive correspondence with the newspaper's editors. 51 ,52 These activities present both positive and potentially negative aspects. They demonstrate a human touch, an opportunity for negotiation and mediation. On the other hand, they pose the spectre of the sort of arbitrary harassment that authorities in many countries have employed to threaten the mass media if their content is considered offensive. To guard against this risk, a crucial element will be the existence of effective independent review of the Regulator's actions. As we will discuss below, this is a weak link in the TMC system.
Another dimension of the investigative mode provides the Regulator with the opportunity to construe and apply legal norms in deciding whether or not to proceed with formal prosecution. An example is the TMC's 25 April, 2001 letter to Mr Xhavit Haliti, demonstrating the TMC's will.ingness to constr~~ international human rights norms in applying the normatIve base mandate. Mr Haliti a leading figure in the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK), had asked the TMC to investigate the possibility of charges against the newspap~r Bota Sot. 54 We quote an excerpt from his letter at length because of what It reveals regarding the TMC's investigative and prosecutorial style:
I have written to Bota Sot concerning your complaints and have discussed your concerns with them at length. Unfortunately, given the very specific nature of the Regulation I have to tell you that I do not consider that I can proceed on this matter any further. To be sure of a successful action under the Regulation all the various criteria that it stipulates must be satisfied and this is not possible in the articles to which you refer. Nevertheless, I must say that I consider these a~ticles to have been deliberately sensational, unsubstantiated and provocatIve and I have made these and other points forcefully to the Editor and will continue to do so.
I also note from your letter that you understand the principle that as a public figure you will often be exposed to criticism and allegations. T?is is the one of the negative aspects of public political debate. In applYIng the conditions of the European Convention on Human Rights in regard to freedom of expression you will be aware that the European Court has taken the view that public figures are not entitled to the same measure of protection in cases of defamation than [sic] are private citizen.s. This is another reason why I believe that a case taken up on the basIs of your complaints would not stand scrutiny by the Media Appeals Board.
This example serves as an illustration of TMC's efforts to operate within .the constraints oflaw, including the fundamental norms in the UNMIK constitutional structure.
Formal Prosecution
In Kosovo, the prosecutorial energies of the TMC have been focused o~ cases involving suspected incitement of violence against individuals. At .tIme ?f writing, the TMC has invoked the formal sanctioning process three tImes, In actions against three different newspapers. 55 In each case, the charge was the same: violation of Section 4.1 of Regulation 2000/37.
The Regulator is empowered to prosecute suspected violations of ~he normative base which is rendered enforceable by means of a range of remedIes, , . ' . . 56 including financial penalties and suspensIOn or termInatIOn of operatIOns. The exercise of these powers implicates a number of general principles of law. First, according to those principles, the laws and process must be transparent and 'lawful' -that is, based on existing, published, generally applicable legal
norms generated by the legislature and not the executive branch. This means operating pursuant to generally applicable, published normative base. One measuring stick is to ascertain whether the norms in question have sufficient precision and clarity to satisfy the 'prescribed by law' requirement in Article 10(2) of the ECHR. 57 As implemented in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the module, with its published normative base, appears to satisfy these standards. For example, in those cases in Kosovo in which prosecution has been invoked, these conditions appear to have been satisfied. In this regard, it should be noted that despite his evident opposition to Bota Sot's alleged unprofessional conduct expressed in the 'Altering Photos' news release, TMC Simon Haselock did not pursue legal action against the newspaper. 58
This contrasts with the action of the SRSG in June 2000, when it closed the office of the newspaper Dita for eight days on the grounds that Dita and its editors 'had violated the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999),.59 The SRSG's action was taken in response to the events of spring 2000, when Dita identified Topoljski, as mentioned, a Serbian UNMIK employee, as a war criminal and provided both a photo of Mr Topoljski and details of his name, address and workplace information. Topoljski was found murdered on 16 May, and on 19 May, the editor of Dita published an open letter to the SRSG, indicating that the newspaper would continue to publish the names of individuals 'involved against Albanians'. It is doubtful that SC Resolution 1244, which does not refer to expressive activity in any way and is not directed toward private actors, contains any language that would support the conclusion that closure of a newspaper for publication of detailed information about an individual, even if done so in order to advocate violence against that person, would satisfy the 'prescribed by law' standard. 6o
Other general principles relevant to the module relate to the process itself: an accused's right to be heard, equality before the law, and opportunity for appea1. 61 The TMC's mandate in Regulation 2000/37 provides little direction on the procedures to be followed by the TMC in determining the existence of a violation and imposing sanctions. 62 However, the structure and process of prosecution have evolved quickly into a more formal set of legal rules and safeguards. In this regard, the important step was the MAB's decision in the Dita case, in which the MAB overturned the TMC's decision to impose sanctions on the newspaper because of procedural infirmities: violations of international norms and the law in effect in Kosovo in 1989. 63 In response to that decision, the TMC adopted measures to provide greater procedural safeguards for accused. 64 According to the Media Hearings Board Rules of Procedure, if the TMC concludes that a violation has occurred and that prosecution is warranted, the formal process must begin with the TMC's presentation of written notice (which we will call an 'Accusation'), which must inform the alleged violator of an opportunity to reply.65 The indictment must then be presented to the MHB, which determines whether a violation has occurred and, in addition, recommends to the TMC whether there are any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that should be taken into account when the TMC decides upon the appropriate remedies and/or penalties. 66 The TMC is not permitted to impose sanctions without a finding by the MHB that the media outlet or representative in question has violated one or more rules in the normative base.
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At the MHB hearing, both the TMC and the respondent, who may be represented by an attorney, are allowed to address the Board for no more than forty minutes, and each member of the Board may question the parties for up to thirty minutes. The Board may invite for oral presentation third-party witnesses and experts; the Rules of Procedure do not provide the parties a right to question those persons. 68 The burden of proof upon all such issues is upon the TMC. 69 The TMC's decision as to penalties may be appealed to the Media Appeals Board. 7o The MAB is empowered to uphold, modify, or rescind the TMC's sanctioning decision. Throughout, questions of accountability and independence loom over this process. Is there sufficient sharing and diffusion of power to guard adequately against abuses by the authorities? Is the Regulator sufficiently independent from the legislator/executive SRSG? Is the Regulator accountable only to the law? By what mechanisms are the Regulator's acts reviewed to determine their compliance with these principles?
Here, again, certain general principles (sensitive to the special needs of a post-conflict context) should apply. For example, a prosecutor is bound by law, and only the law (here, this means the fundamental norms in the UNMIK Constitution, as well as the normative base); a prosecutor must be independent from legislative and executive branch control; and, to insure observance of these standards, a prosecutor's act must be subject to review by an independent agency.71 The last point is perhaps the key to the entire system of administrative justice. In effect, it provides that there must -again subject to the possibly special circumstances of conflict zones -be a supervisory system of control sufficiently independent to make an objective determination as to whether the administrator has acted in compliance not only with other principles of administrative justice, but with all applicable legal norms as well.
While clearly an effort to assure procedural fairness, the module's structure and procedures raise certain questions from the point of view of compatibility with these principles. First, there is the question of the TMC's independence from the SRSG, which is both the UNMIK legislature and executive. According to the TMC's organic statute, the TMC has independent status and is temporary pending the establishment of effective domestic parallel structures. 72 The meaning of 'independence' in this context is not explained.
The individual TMC is named by the SRSG; however, the SRSG is not involved in the day-to-day functions of the TMC, nor is there evidence that the SRSG has exerted any direct influence on the TMC's actions. 73 Second, and perhaps more problematic, are a series of questions related to the roles of the TMC, the MHB, and the MAB. The MHB is analogous to a trial court, with the judge or jury making the ultimate determination of guilt or A MODULE FOR MEDIA INTERVENTION innocence. However, this MHB decision is insulated from review. In addi( if a violation is found, it is the Regulator (the TMC) who decides on the na::;~ of the penalties -definitely a judicial or jury function that should be outside the Regu~ator's powers. ~y possessing the ability to decide upon and impose sanctIOns, the TMC IS both prosecutor and judge.
Next, the question must be asked, although it is very difficult to answer w~et~er the MHB and MAB are sufficiently independent to satisfy general pnncIples and the UNMIK Constitution. In the context of ECHR Article 6.1, the ECtHR has construed 'independent' as independence from the legislative and executive branches, as well as the parties. 74 The European Court's determinations as to the independence of control bodies is very fact-intensive and given the scope of our inquiry, we can simply cite the factors listed by the Court;
In order to determine whether a body can be considered to be 'independent' of the executive it is necessary to have regard to the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the que~tion whether the body presents an appearance of independence?5
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are three significant areas in which the Kosovo MAB lacks competence: (1) review of the Regulator's investigative acts; (2) review of the MHB's decisions as to guilt or innocence; and (3) review of the SRSG's legislative acts. 76 ,77,78 As to the last of these, this means that the MAB's competence also does not extend to a power of review over the normative base itself, to determine if its provisions comport with the fundamental norms of the UNMIK Constitution.
In sum, significant steps in the evolution of the module have been taken to insure adequate safeguards for the mass media. However, particularly before the module is again employed in a post-conflict situation, attention should be devoted to further analysis and structural and procedural revisions. These matters go directly to fundamental issues about the module's legitimacy.
The Quest for Legitimacy
The emerging system of information intervention, reflected in the module, rests on a thin veneer of acceptance within the global community at large: the assumption, by the UN Security Council and secretary-general, that regulation of m~dia content is both acceptable and integral to democracy building in postconflIct societies, and that it is possible to conduct it in a way that is compatible with international free speech and free press standards. 79 The initial emergence of the module met with intense criticism from free press advocates.
8o The significance of this lies in the reminder to the United Nations and other international organizations that this system of governance at bottom is reliant upon a public legitimacy, difficult to obtain or sustain in light of the perceived threat to news media freedoms. From a slightly different perspective, the concerns about legitimacy might also stem from a democratic deficit in international institutions. To address these concerns, it is necessary to have safeguards against heavyhandedness, or even the appearance of such heavy-handedness, by assuring procedural fairness and objectivity. In this regard, in addition to noting the binding fundamental norms in the UNMIK Constitution, much of our discussion has been grounded in an assumption that certain general principles apply here as a matter oflaw. But even if they might not as a matter oflaw, they should be followed as a matter of policy, for the sake of establishing and maintaining legitimacy.
Even more generally, the human rights rationale for what might be called 'aggressive peacemaking' and the intrusiveness into the zone of freedom of expression is a precarious one. To achieve legitimacy, processes of information intervention need popular support from the very people and institutions from whom it faces determined opposition -media NGOs, especially free speech and free press advocates. A critical sticking point for these NGOs is the question of whether circumstances ever can exist to justify a rearticulation and reframing of widely accepted standards of free speech/free press. How norms are developed, their very entry and maturation, will have an influence on how they are received by these significant groups. The UN must find ways of engaging those who 'vote' on the question of legitimacy.
The development and presentation of free speech norms in the information intervention context is important for another reason. Peacekeeping operations are partly designed to provide a context sufficiently altered and enhanced that a more democratic society can flourish after the operation has been dissolved. Construction of a public sphere that supports a democratic society is an element of that process. When an international governmental organization engages in regulation of the press, its actions may affect the nature of the political system that follows. How a regulatory rule is shaped, how it is presented in the society, how those who will be subject to a seemingly censorial rule react and accept that rule -all these are part of the difficult process of democracy development in a conflict zone. 81 
Conclusion
The module is a work in progress, based on exigencies, which dictated not only its form and substance, but indeed its very rationale for existence. The postconflict intervention functions within the existing organizational structure of the United Nations and is intended to be a temporary system designed to respond to an environment of lawlessness and violence and the absence of effective domestic legal institutions.
Two interlocking themes form the framework for understanding this normative base: the pervasive nature of human rights law, and the specific post-conflict circumstances in Kosovo. Because they directly affect the exercise of free expression guaranteed in international human rights instruments, and because some of the normative base exceeds what is required of states to regulate hate speech under international norms, an over-riding question becomes whether the restrictions on media content are permissible interferences with media freedoms.
These have always been complex issues in domestic legal systems. The emergence of the module now presents a new dimension for the study of these long-standing issues in the sphere of mass media law. 9. The module's normative base is a substitution of international law for a domestic legal regime. However, in contrast to traditional international regulatory systems, the subjects of regulation are not states, but private natural and legal persons. As Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter put it, this idea of the supranational ~ fulfilled by the emerging module ~ 'represents another departure from the bedrock assumption of traditional public international law: that states, functioning as unitary entities, are the only subjects of international rules and institutions and hence the only recognized actors in the international realm'. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm paras. S2-3 include the following:
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UNMIK has the unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundation for democratic and professional media in Kosovo . . . UNMIK will support the emergence of independent media and will monitor compliance with international media standards. The Special Representative will appoint a media regulatory commission to manage the frequency spectrum, establish broadcast and press codes of conduct, and issue licences ... In facing the challenge of fostering the development of independent media in Kosovo, UNMIK will promote a media culture based on democratic principles. SO. See 
